Microfinance has become a staple of modern development policy as a means to facilitate anything from gender equality to growth. It can facilitate the sharing of health-related information among parents, promote the bargaining power of women in the household, aid in the development of important healthrelated infrastructure, and help households smooth consumption in the wake of unexpected economic shocks. Using data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000), we find that the presence of microfinance institutions in communities significantly improves the health of children.
INTRODUCTION
A large body of literature exists on the determinants of child health, 1 but because much of the early work was limited to cross-sectional data, research on the intertemporal determinants of child health is still developing. Over time, children"s health can be disrupted in numerous ways.
Household idiosyncratic shocks like prime-age adult mortality or illness lead to significant changes to household income and wealth. 2 If households are unable to smooth consumption in the wake of such shocks, the negative effects on child health may be substantial. Similarly, nonidiosyncratic shocks such as drought or financial crisis can also be detrimental to children"s health.
The impact of these non-idiosyncratic, macroeconomic shocks on child health outcomes is just now beginning to be understood. Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) find that the 1994-1995 droughts in Zimbabwe significantly lowered annual growth rates for children, with the effects still present four years after the drought. Similarly, Yamano, Alderman, and Christiaensen (2005) find that the drought in Ethiopia from 1996-1997 resulted in increased rates of child stunting. Paxson and Schady (2005) report an increase of 2.5 percentage points in the infant mortality rate for children born during the economic crisis in Peru in the late 1980s. Using panel data from Russia during its recent economic transition, Fedorov and Sahn (2005) conclude that time-varying economic determinants related to household income and macroeconomic indicators like food prices account for a relatively large amount of the variation in child growth, far more than had been previously found in studies using cross-sectional data. One implication of these studies is that macroeconomic policy has a potentially important role in determining child health outcomes.
One such policy that offers great promise is microfinance. Microfinance has become a staple of modern development policy as a means to facilitate anything from gender equality to poverty reduction (Khandker 2005) . One way that microcredit has been hypothesized to influence child health outcomes is through the development of parents" social capital. In a recent study, Nobles and Frankenberg (2009) find that children from households with lower levels of wealth and human capital fare better when their mothers are more active participants in community organizations. The reason participation is thought to influence child health is that these informal networks provide a way for parents to circulate information about such things as nutrition and communicable diseases. In this sense, social capital in developing communities plays a similar role in the improvement of child health as formal maternal education does in more developed communities (Nobles and Frankenberg 2009 ).
Another related mechanism for affecting child health is through the empowerment of women. Historically, microfinance has often been aimed specifically at increasing women"s access to credit. As Miller and Rogers (1999) argue, anything that improves the economic wellbeing of women will affect household bargaining power. With greater power, women are in a better position to bargain for a greater share of household resources to be allocated towards expenditures that improve the health and well-being of children.
In addition to expanding the social capital of parents and the economic power of women, the presence of microfinance institutions in a community is likely to affect child health through more traditional mechanisms. For example, the availability of credit for entrepreneurs is likely to lead to economic diversification and wealth creation throughout the community. This increase in wealth will eventually support the development of health-related infrastructure such as sanitation and medical facilities.
Credit also provides an important tool for smoothing household consumption in the wake of unexpected shocks. In a recent article, Gertler, Levine and Moretti (2009) investigate the importance of access to microfinance institutions in the wake of heterogeneous shocks. They find that access to credit significantly improves consumption smoothing in the wake of adult illness. Of course, credit can also help households respond to macroeconomic shocks. For example, Foster (1995) found that, compared to those without access to credit, households in Bangladesh with such access were better able to smooth household consumption following the floods of 1988. He speculates that small-scale lending programs such as microcredit may even be able to positively affect child health outcomes in the face of these kinds of macroeconomic shocks. To date, however, we know of no other research that has attempted to quantify such an effect.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the presence of microfinance institutions within a community affects child health outcomes. This study uses data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 1993-2000. The IFLS not only collects anthropometric data on children, but it also has detailed information at the community level regarding the types of financial institutions available as well as other key infrastructure that typically come with development. In addition, because the survey itself spans the years of the Asian financial crisis and its aftermath, it provides an interesting case in which to examine the effects of changes in the presence of microfinance institutions on child health. Between 1993 and 1997, Indonesia experienced significant growth immediately preceding the crisis that started in late 1997. From 1997 through the eventual recovery, communities not only experienced large variations in income and wealth, but also in the presence of factories, sanitation, health facilities and, of course, microfinance. 3 The idea is to exploit this shock-induced variation to distinguish the effects on child health due to changes in the presence of microfinance and those due to changes in other indicators associated with community development.
The organization of the paper is as follows: (1) a brief history of microfinance institutions in Indonesia is provided, including a taxonomic discussion of modern institutions and their defining characteristics; (2) the econometric model is presented with specific attention to how we address the issue of identification; (3) the data are defined and descriptive statistics for the sample are discussed; (4) results for the models are presented; and (5) relevant implications are discussed.
MICROFINANCE IN INDONESIA
Indonesia"s microfinance industry is one of the oldest and most commercialized in the world. In this section we provide a brief overview of the development of Indonesia"s financial system as it pertains to our focus on the types of microfinance institutions available throughout Indonesia during our sample period. 4 Of particular interest are the financial reforms that have enabled the spread of these financial institutions throughout the country as well as the key differences that exist among the major institutions.
According to the World Bank (Ravicz 1998) Based largely on the degree of commercialization, Charitonenko and Afwan (2003) classify Indonesian microfinance institutions as formal or informal 5 (see Table 1 . This is particularly important given that the majority of loans are used not for the expansion of production, but for the maintenance of household consumption. According to data from the IFLS 2000 survey, 43 percent of loans taken out were reported to be for normal household expenses 6 while less than 30 percent were for purposes related to business or agricultural investments.
As Indonesia"s financial industry has evolved, two distinct types of institutions have developed to serve the market. Larger MFIs tend to be more formal, make larger loans and serve relatively less-poor borrowers. On the contrary, smaller, semi-formal MFIs, tend to serve the very poor; consequently, they make considerably smaller-sized loans. They are also frequently the first type of microfinance institution to enter a community. As will be clear in the following sections, the differences in the type and size of MFIs within a given community play an important role in affecting child health outcomes.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Consider the health, h, of the ith child, in household g, in village j at time t. Child health outcomes are commonly measured by anthropometrics like height or weight (or combinations of these). According to Strauss and Thomas (1998) , height is the best long-term indicator of nutritional status in children. Moreover, height has also been shown to be correlated with productivity, wages, and long-run growth (Strauss and Thomas 1998) . For this reason, we follow the literature and use height as our proxy for child health. Following convention, we normalize height by conditioning on both age and sex as is done is recent studies that use the IFLS such as Frankenberg, Suriastini and Thomas (2005) , and Nobles and Frankenberg (2009) .
The underlying structural model can be written as:
( 1) where X represents household and community effects that vary with time, MFI is a dummy variable denoting the presence of a microfinance institution in the community, c represents individual fixed effects, represents household fixed effects, µ is community fixed effects, and γ denotes time effects. A great deal of literature over the years has concentrated on identifying the household fixed effects that affect child health. The most obvious of these is education of the mother. 7 One way to control for these fixed effects is to rewrite the model in first-differences.
The advantage of estimating the model in first-differences rather than as a fixed-effects model is that autocorrelation is addressed at the same time. Thus given the nature of our dependent variable (child height), the difference model is the most reasonable way to specify our model:
Before discussing the critical issues involving the econometric identification of the effects of MFIs on child health, there is an important issue relating to the treatment of the term that must be addressed. This term represents the average changes in z-scores over time after controlling for the other determinants of change in health. If Indonesian children are on average catching up to the rest of the world in terms of height, then this term would be positive.
If they are falling further behind, it is negative. But there is another issue present. Because we are tracking children over time, we expect there to be some degree of reversion to the mean within Indonesia itself. That is, those children who are measured below average in height in 1993 are likely to grow faster than their peers who measured above average. Analysis of the distribution confirms this occurrence as the standard deviation of z-scores in the sample decreases throughout the sample period. To avoid the simultaneity bias that would occur if we included a lag of the dependent variable as an additional regressor, we have chosen to simply include a dummy variable to denote if the child was below the 50 th percentile in height relative to his Indonesian peers in 1993. 8 As a result, the constant plus the coefficient on this dummy variable will estimate the average change in the z-score for height for those children starting off below the 50 th percentile. Obviously, the sign on the dummy variable should be positive and significant. The combined effect of the constant plus the dummy is ambiguous because while there is reversion to the mean, we expect the mean Indonesian child to be falling behind relative to the international standard. The constant term by itself will estimate the average change for those children starting off above the 50th percentile. This term should be negative and significant.
In equation 2, ∆MFI represents the change in the presence of a microfinance institution at the community level. It is expected that when a community gains a microfinance institution, child health improves (ξ>0). There are a number of theoretical reasons why access to microfinance might positively affect children"s" health. 9 First, the presence of MFIs in a community offers parents a new way to participate in a semi-formal social network. In poorer, less-educated communities, parents share vital information about health-related issues through informal networks. Recent research by Nobles and Frankenberg (2009) confirms this effect. By increasing parents" social capital, participation in community organizations appears to improve children"s health. Second, microfinance has historically been aimed at increasing the earnings of women. Any policy that enhances the economic power of women will also have positive spillovers to children because women are more likely than men to invest in children"s health and education (Miller and Rogers 1999) . Third, because microfinance promotes long-term economic development, we expect to see a simultaneous improvement of children"s health. As communities develop, the public and medical infrastructure associated with better health will typically improve. Fourth, the presence of microfinance institutions has a direct impact on families' access to credit. When faced with binding budget constraints, families with access to credit during times of crises (such as the Asian financial crisis) are better able to smooth their consumption, allowing them to better provide inputs to child growth.
The first challenge of the empirical methodology is to try to separate out these competing effects on child health. Because we are able to observe many of the developments such as increases in sanitation, healthcare facilities, cottage industries, factories, etc., the effect of MFIs on child health via broad-based development should be captured by these regressors. As we discuss below, controlling for total household expenditures on food should capture the effect of consumption-smoothing. Thus, holding food consumption and development constant, any change in MFIs that affects changes in children"s height is most likely due to the changes in social capital that assist in transmitting health-related information to parents or changes in the bargaining power of women in the household.
is the matrix of changes in household and community characteristics that vary over time. Typically, researchers attempt to control for changes in household income. Because such measures are unreliable and poorly measured in developing countries, it is common to use a broad measure of household consumption. The assumption is that increases in total expenditures will allow for greater resources to be allocated to children"s caloric intake and healthcare.
Unfortunately, the consumption measures provided in the IFLS do not allow us to observe expenditures on healthcare directly. We found the most robust measure to be total expenditures on food, rather than a broader measure that would include spending on non-health-related items.
Because a rise in the number of household members, all else equal, will decrease the resources allocated to any one child, we divide total food expenditures by total household size. Inflation will also decrease the resources available to each child. We have accounted for this by converting food expenditures into constant 2007 prices using deflators provided by the World Bank. For urban areas, a deflator based on urban CPI was used, while another based on rural poverty lines was used to deflate prices in rural areas. As noted above, the use of consumption as a control variable arguably allows us to isolate the effects of MFIs not related to consumption smoothing by households.
As discussed above, it is also important to account for other community-level changes across time as such development is likely to be correlated with the arrival (or departure) of MFIs into (or out of) the community. Changes in community characteristics that affect child health come from two sources. The first accounts for the presence of manufacturing firms (e.g., factories, cottage industries) in the community. Both factories and cottage industries may indirectly affect child health by enhancing the economic status of women. This in turn is likely to result in an increase in the share of household resources devoted to children (Miller and Rodgers 2009 ). These industries may also provide insurance for both households and the community in the face of drought or other events that threaten agricultural output. On the other hand, the presence of factories could harm child health through increased pollution or incidence of child labor. The second category of community-level characteristics that affects child health is represented by changes in health-related infrastructure such as sanitation and medical care.
The IFLS asks a number of relevant questions that allow us to attempt to control for these characteristics. These include whether there is a sewage system in the village, whether there is a medical post in the village, and the number of posyandu 10 in the community.
One possible problem is that these community-level changes may themselves be endogenous. The reason is that the communities expected to see the largest increase in access to medical care or sanitation will be those places that did not previously have such access. On average, these are likely to be the poorest communities. At the same time, the children in these communities are likely to be among the worst in terms of health. If the effect of improvements in community infrastructure takes time to positively affect child health outcomes, then the estimates of B in equation 2 will be biased downward. We test for this possibility in section 5.
11
The second major challenge relates to the identification of MFI itself. As described in Section II, different banks serve different purposes and different clientele. Small banks, or semiformal MFIs, often serve the very poor and are also frequently the first type of microfinance institution to enter a community. As a result, it is entirely plausible that in poorer communities initially lacking access to MFIs, obtaining a new small bank will have a greater impact on child health than obtaining a large bank. Moreover, as will be apparent in the following section, most of the variability in access to MFIs across communities in our sample period comes as a result of these smaller MFIs either entering or exiting.
Using community-level access to MFIs allows us to avoid the problem of endogeneity that arises from unobserved shocks to the household budget constraint that simultaneously affect children"s health and increases the likelihood of borrowing. Of course, because most of the smaller MFIs discussed in Section II are sponsored at least in part by the government, policyendogeneity is introduced. Policy-makers and bank officials have an incentive to introduce MFIs into the poorest, most needy communities. Because these are also the very communities with the worst healthcare and child nutrition, such endogeneity will bias ξ downward. Similarly, the entrance of MFIs will be simultaneously determined with changes in child health if there is unobserved heterogeneity at the community level. Such heterogeneity could result from changes associated with broad-based economic development not captured by variables such as changes in sanitation, access to medical care, etc., that were discussed above.
To deal with the endogeneity of changes in the availability of microfinance, we estimate the model where we instrument for ∆MFI using changes in community characteristics that are uncorrelated with changes in health. For a number of reasons, larger, more urban, communities are more likely to gain microfinance institutions. Logically, bank officials are more likely to introduce new MFIs to the areas in which they are expected to have the greatest impact. These would be the larger, more urban communities that lack MFIs. Once established, MFIs in these urban areas are also more likely to remain. In addition to whether a community is urbanized, there are other changes in community-level characteristics that are likely to be good instruments for ∆MFI. Electrification is one change in infrastructure that occurs in the early stages of community development, but that has no direct impact on health. It is likely to help spur the growth of small businesses that also require capital. As a result, changes in electrification are likely to be a suitable instrument for the change in MFIs.
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
This study uses data from the first three waves of the Indonesian Family Our strategy is to follow the anthropometric development of children through their most formative years. Because the effects of changes in institutions are measured relative to the base year in 1993, we restricted the sample to those alive in 1993 and who would be younger than 15
by the end of the period (2000).
As mentioned previously, our anthropometric measure is child height. Using 1990
British growth charts, we have standardized height by age in years and sex. Because children in Indonesia fall well below this international average in height, we omit observations more than 5 standard deviations from the Indonesian mean, rather than the British mean as is typically done in standard software packages. This accommodation ensures that the distribution of height is in fact approximately normally distributed at the beginning of our sample in 1993. Another issue with this data is measurement error. To limit bias in this regard, we have chosen to also omit observations if the change in z-scores between periods exceeds 4 standard deviations.
Particularly relevant to this research is the IFLS's inclusion of community-level data on the availability of microfinance institutions. As noted previously, we want to distinguish between the sizes of banks within various communities. We define the large banks (LARGEMFI) to be the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) and People"s Credit Bank (BPR). All other institutions are defined as small banks (SMALLMFI). Definitions for all variables are summarized in Table A .1 of the Appendix. Tables 3-4 . Table 3 shows statistics from the pooled sample, while Table 4 reports the same statistics depending on whether the community did or did not have an MFI in 1993. The first thing to note in Table 3 is that Indonesian children began the period well-below their peers internationally in terms of height. On average, Indonesian children were 1.2 standards deviations below average in terms of height for age and sex. Not surprisingly, given the dramatic financial upheaval that 
<TABLE 3 here>
There are notable differences between the communities that had MFIs in 1993 and those that did not. Due to the fact that one of the primary functions of microfinance is to spur economic development, it is not surprising that those communities with MFIs in 1993 were wealthier and better-developed than their counterparts with no MFIs in 1993 (see Table 4 ).
Those living in communities with MFIs were more than twice as likely to live in urban areas, have regular garbage collection and a sewage system. They also had better access to medical facilities, electricity, and had more non-agricultural industries (factories and cottage industries).
Not surprisingly, the children were also taller in the communities that had MFIs. This is not, apparently, due to significantly better access to food, because the average household consumption per member (lnHHFOODPC) was virtually identical across both groups in 1993.
<TABLE 4 here>
The changes in household and community characteristics across the sample period differed as well. In communities without MFIs in 1993, children fell slightly further behind their international peers than did those in the more developed communities. Though average food consumption declined for both groups, those households in communities without MFIs in 1993 decreased food consumption by about 2 percent more per period than those in communities with
MFIs. Most of the other changes were similar across the groups. Two notable exceptions were that those without MFIs in 1993 were more likely to gain cottage industries while those with
MFIs were more likely to gain factories.
Overall, these data highlight some aspects that will inform our estimation of the model in the subsequent section. First and foremost, it shows that most of the variability in MFI access over the period is due to the entrance and exit of the smaller MFIs. As we discussed in section 2, these smaller MFIs have a much smaller average loan size and are more likely to cater to the poorest clients. The data also highlight the differences between those communities that originally had MFIs and those that did not. Those with MFIs in 1993 were clearly wealthier, more urban and better developed. Over the seven-year period, these wealthier communities lost many of their MFIs. On the contrary, the poorer communities (those without MFIs in 1993)
gained MFIs, particularly small MFIs. Not surprisingly, they too experienced a decrease in MFIs from their peak in 1997 after the financial crisis that began in late 1997. Table 5 , only the change in small MFIs is instrumented. All other regressors are assumed exogenous.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Given that the results are critically dependent on the instruments, it is important to examine their validity. For the six models reported in Table 5 , the first stage is reported in Table   A .3 in the Appendix. In Table A As important as the econometric tests are to establishing instrument validity is whether the first-stage results are consistent with theory. The results in Table A .3 confirm that the instruments do have the expected effects on the change in small MFIs across communities.
Urbanization positively and significantly affects the probability that a small MFI enters (or remains in) the market, with the probability a small MFI enters (or remains in) an urban community being roughly 0.06 higher than in rural communities. Also as expected, an increase in the rate of electrification raises the probability that small MFIs enter (or remain) in the community.
Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the other indicators of community-level economic development is typically correlated with the presence of small MFIs. In particular, increases in the number of posyandu, factories, and cottage industries are all associated with the entrance of new smaller MFIs into a community. Arguably, the establishment of factories and cottage industries may be due to the availability of microfinance rather than the reverse. However, because we want to confidently pinpoint whether the presence of small MFIs in and of themselves affects child health, we are willing to assume these are exogenous to changes in the presence of MFIs. 
Having established the validity of the instruments used to predict the presence of small MFIs, we can turn our attention to the determinants of child growth in Table 5 . The main controls exhibited expected signs and were significant in all specifications. Changes in real household food expenditures per person had a positive, but small, effect on children"s growth.
The dummy for whether the child was originally below the Indonesian median for height for his age and sex is positive and significant in all specifications. The constant, however, is negative and significant. This implies that for those beginning above their age-sex median, they fell onehalf a standard deviation further below their peers internationally. However, those children initially below the median, all else equal, held their ground relative to international standards. This is consistent with reversion to the mean within this sample of Indonesian children.
<TABLE 5 here>
Finally, the results with respect to the presence of small MFIs are strong and revealing.
Children in communities that gained or maintained access to these MFIs gained roughly one standard deviation in height relative to international standards. Of course, roughly as many children lost access to small MFIs over these periods than gained it. For them, the loss of these institutions in their local community had devastating effects.
DISCUSSION
So what can we infer about the effect of small MFIs on child health? Recall the four theoretical explanations for why the presence of MFIs might affect child health. Smaller MFIs could: (1) facilitate the acquisition of parents" (especially mothers") social capital, thereby increasing parents" knowledge of nutrition and other health concerns; (2) increase the bargaining power of women, leading to a shifting of household resources towards expenditures that improve the well-being of the children; (3) encourage broad economic growth, resulting in improvements in community infrastructure like sanitation and healthcare; or (4) provide households with the ability to smooth consumption in the wake of shocks to wealth and income. While it is difficult to disentangle these effects, it appears some explanations are more consistent with the evidence than others.
First, small MFIs appear to affect child health through avenues independent of broader economic development. The justification for this inference relies on the fact that we have attempted to control for changes in important infrastructures in the regression models. The only indicator of broader economic development that was significant was the presence of factories, and it was negative. Perhaps since we controlled for household expenditures on food separately, any positive effect from factories may have been accounted for through the consumption effect.
Still the negative effect is curious. Perhaps the presence of factories increased pollution or child labor. Possibly, however, the story is less nefarious. Recall that these indicators were weakly indentified when treated as endogenous. Perhaps the lack of significance of any of these factors is a function of endogeneity and weak identification. This is an avenue worth pursuing in future work. Still, it is worth noting that while all these other covariates were weakly identified, the presence of small MFIs was not. Overall, this provides evidence that the large effect we find is truly related to the presence of small MFIs and not merely correlated with other indicators of economic development.
Second, because we directly controlled for real household expenditures, it also appears that the large effect attributed to the change in access to smaller MFIs is not due to consumption smoothing. For example, if the loss of small MFIs caused a significant loss of access to credit, this should have been seen through the estimated effect of household food expenditures on the change in height. Given the relatively small effect of expenditures on child growth, it would appear that the biggest effect of these small MFIs comes independently of consumption.
To the contrary, it is possible that there are unaccounted for changes in the allocation of these food resources. If the presence of smaller MFIs has raised the bargaining power of women, it is possible that the children are now receiving a relatively larger share of the limited food resources than they did previously (even holding total food expenditures per person constant).
All else equal, this could explain at least part of the increase in height. Furthermore, the loss of MFIs would also mean a loss of bargaining power for women in the household. So it is entirely plausible that losses would result in a deterioration of children"s health.
Finally, it is also possible that the entrance and exit of smaller MFIs during this period have affected child height through the creation and destruction of social capital. As MFIs enter the community, social capital is created along with economic growth, access to credit, and increased economic power for women. The loss of MFIs carries the potential to decrease social capital due to the fact that residents have one less formal organization in which to belong.
Recent evidence by Nobles and Frankenberg (2009) supports this explanation as they found that a mother"s participation in formal community organizations has a significant, positive effect on her children"s health. What is unknown is the extent to which a loss in small MFIs might also be correlated with the loss of other venues for community participation and engagement. This suggests another potentially fruitful area for future investigation.
CONCLUSION
While other researchers have speculated about the possible impact of microfinance on child health outcomes, this paper is the first to our knowledge to investigate the hypothesis.
Ultimately, the data strongly support this link. The presence of microfinance institutions in communities has a large and positive effect on relative changes in children"s health. Sorting out this relationship, however, is not without its challenges.
The largest of these has to do with endogeneity. While we are able to deal with the household-level endogeneity by using community-level access rather than using whether or not the household had borrowed money during the period, the entrance of such institutions into new communities is in-and-of-itself endogenous. Ideally the entrance of MFIs into previously unserved communities would be administered by randomized experiments. This is simply not realistic for anything but small-scale programs and studies. Fortunately, however, satisfactory instruments exist in the IFLS that allow us to deal with this problem.
The second challenge is to identify the means through which the presence of MFIs affects child health. Theoretically, MFIs can affect child health by: (1) providing a powerful mechanism through which parents can increase their social capital and support the spread of health-related knowledge; (2) increasing the bargaining power of women so that resources are shifted towards expenditure that most benefit children; (3) promoting broad-based community economic development; and (4) providing a way for families to smooth consumption in response to income shocks. Because we are able to control for changes in real household food consumption expenditures per person and other indicators of economic development, it appears that the large, positive effect of the new entrance of smaller MFIs in communities on children"s health is due to increases in the bargaining power of women and/or the development of social capital. However, this does not imply that MFIs do not also help smooth consumption or promote economic development. Rather, it implies that MFIs are able to affect child health through these other mechanisms and that the effect is potentially large. While these results are indicative of the importance of the presence of MFIs on the welfare of children, the precise nature of this mechanism warrants further analysis. Winnings from arisan activity could also affect child nutrition by providing extra spending money for food and other household items. These winnings are included in household income.
APPENDIX
For our purposes, any positive effect from arisan winnings will be captured by an increase in total household expenditures.
10 These are mobile health clinics sponsored by the Indonesian government that are designed to promote child health.
11 The instrument used in this process is whether or not the village had regular garbage collection. Garbage collection is correlated with other broad improvements like access to medical care and the presence of sewers. While the lack of centralized garbage collection could certainly adversely affect health if it breeds disease, this effect is assumed to be far less strong and direct than that of sewage systems or the presence of medical operations. In models 2-6, the additional explanatory variable is treated as exogenous.
